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In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho

LAW CLERK
VERMONT TROTTER,
Plaintift~Appellont,

)
)
)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
SUPPLEMENT RECORD

)
)
)

~

BANK OF NEW YORK MELL.ON, f7k/a
BANK OF NEW YORK AS TRUSTEES FOR
THE CERTIFICATE HOLDERS OF
CWALT,INC.,ALTERNATIVELOAN
TRUST2005-28CB MORTGAGE PASS·
THROUGH CERTIFICATES 2005-28CB;
MORTGATE ELECTRONIC
REGISTRATON SYSTEMS, INC.;
RECONTRUST COMPANY, N.A.,

Supreme Court Docket No. 38022-2010
Kootenai County District C.Ourt No.
20 1().9S

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Ref. No. I 1-451

)

Defendants-Respondents.

)

The above entitled appeal is currently scheduled for oral argument on Wednesday,
September 28, 20 I I, at 8:50 a.m. in Moscow, Idaho. Thereafter, a MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT
RECORD with attachment was filed by Appellant Vermont Trotter on September 6, 201 I,
requesting this Couri for an Order augmenting the appellate record in the above entitled appeal with
the documents attached to this Motion. Therefore, good cause appearing,
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Appellant Vermont Trotter's MOTION TO
SUPPLEMENT RECORD be, and hereby is, GRANTED and the Record in the above entitled
appeal shall include the document listed below, a lile stamped copy of which accompanied this
Motion:
I. Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants' Motion 10 Dismiss, ftle stamped
May 12, 2010.

. ?~ day ofSeptember, 2011.

DATED this \

AUGMENTATION RECORD
cc:

Counsel of Record

By Order of the Supreme Coun

In the Supreme Court of tl1e State of Idaho
VERMONT TROTTER,

)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Appellant,
V.

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
SUPPLEMENT RECORD

)

Supreme c·ourt Docket No. 38022-2010
Kootenai County District Court No.
2010-95

)
BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON, f/k/a
)
BANK OF NEW YORK AS TRUSTEES FOR )
THE CERTIFICATE HOLDERS OF
)
CWALT, INC., ALTERNATIVE LOAN
)
TRUST 2005-28CB MORTGAGE PASS)
THROUGH CERTIFICATES 2005-28CB;
)
MORTGA TE ELECTRONIC
)
REGISTRATON SYSTEMS, INC.;
)
RECONTRUST COMPANY, N.A.,
)
)
Defendants-Respondents.
)

Ref. No. 11-451

The above entitled appeal 1s currently scheduled for oral argument on Wednesday,
September 28, 2011, at 8:50 a.m. in Moscow, Idaho. Thereafter, a MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT
RECORD with attachment was filed by Appellant Vermont Trotter on September 6, 2011,
requesting this Court for an Order augmenting the appellate record in the above entitled appeal with
the documents attached to this Motion. Therefore, good cause appearing,
IT

HEREBY

IS

ORDERED

that Appellant Vermont Trotter's MOTION

TO

SUPPLEMENT RECORD be, and hereby is, GRANTED and the Record in the above entitled
appeal shall include the document listed below, a file stamped copy of which accompanied this
Motion:

1. Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, file stamped
May 12, 2010.
DATED this_\_ _ day of September, 2011.
By Order of the Supreme Court

Stephen W. Kenyon, Qlerk
cc:

Counsel of Record

I

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT RECORD - Docket No. 38022-2010

2G/Df,~Y 12 PM 2:

MONICA FLOOD BRENNAN, P.C.
Spokesman Review Building
608 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 101
Coeur D'Alene, ID 83814
Tel: (208) 665-0088
Fax: 208-676-8288
Jeff Barnes, Esq. (admitted pro hac vice)
W. J. Barnes, P.A.
Nevada office: c/o International Mediation Associates, Inc.
6655 West Sahara Avenue, Suite B200
Las Vegas, Nevada 89146
Tel: (702) 222-3202
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IADHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

) CIVIL NO: CV-2010-95

VERMONT TROTTER
Plaintiff,

)
)
)

)
) PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM OF
LAW IN OPPOSITION TO
BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON F/K/A BANK
)
DEFENDANTS' MOTION
OF NEW YORK AS TRUSTEE FOR THE
)
TO DISMISS
CERTIFICATEHOLDERS OF CWALT, INC.
)
ALTERNATIVE LOAN TRUST 2005-28CB
)
MORTGAGE PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES)
SERIES 2005-28CB; MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC)
REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC.; and
)
RECONTRUST COMPANY, N.A.,
)
)
)
Defendants.
V.

sr

Plaintiff VERMONT TROTTER, by and through his undersigned attorneys, files
and serves his Response to the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants BANK OF NEW
YORK

MELLON

F/K/A

BANK

OF

NEW YORK

AS

TRUSTEE

FOR

THE

CERTIFICATEHOLDERS OF CWALT, INC. ALTERNATIVE LOAN TRUST 2005-28CB
MORTGAGE

PASS-THROUGH

CERTIFICATES

SERIES

2005-28CB

(hereafter

"BONY"); MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC. (hereafter
"MERS"); and RECONTRUST COMPANY, N.A. (hereafter "RC") and states:
A. Background Facts and Procedural History
1.

Plaintiff VERMONT TROTTER instituted this action for Declaratory and

Injunctive Relief against Defendants BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON F/K/A BANK OF
NEW YORK AS TRUSTEE FOR THE CERTIFICATEHOLDERS OF CWALT, INC.
ALTERNATIVE

LOAN

TRUST

2005-28CB

MORTGAGE

PASS-THROUGH

CERTIFICATES (hereafter "BONY"); MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION
SYSTEMS, INC. (hereafter "MERS"); and RECONTRUST COMPANY, N.A. (hereafter
"RC") challenging an attempt by these Defendants to foreclosure on the residential real
th

property the subject of this action which is located at 512 South 14

Street, Coeur

D'Alene, Idaho 83814 and is legally described as Lot 13 in Block 11 of Lakeshore
Addition to Coeur D'Alene, according to the official plat thereof, filed in Book B of Plats
at page 128, official records of Kootenai County, Idaho (hereafter the "Property"), which
Property is the Plaintiff's primary residence.
2.

As set forth in the Complaint, the Appointment of Successor Trustee claims

that Defendant BONY is the alleged "beneficiary", while the Notice of Trustee's Sale
inconsistently claims that Defendant MERS is the alleged "beneficiary".
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3.

This Court has entered two separate Orders, those being on January 8,

2010 and February 5, 2010, enjoining any foreclosure attempt or sale of the Property,
doing so on February 5, 2010 after full legal argument on the issues raised as to the
legal inability of the Defendants to pursue a foreclosure, which argument was
entertained by this Court as to the factual allegations in the Complaint and the
applicable decisional law which was cited to this Court on the record and which
Plaintiff's counsel was thus made fully aware of at the February 5, 2010 hearing.
4. Notwithstanding that this Court found that an injunction was proper based on
the facts and the law cited and in fact based its decision on the Idaho and Nevada
decisional law cited on the record at the hearing, Defendants have filed a "Motion to
Dismiss" which totally fails to address the applicable law cited at the February 5, 2010
hearing; which is grounded upon a fatally flawed premise; and which provides no basis
whatsoever for dismissal or relief by "summary judgment'.
5.

Defendants' entire position is premised on an allegation that MERS was

authorized to execute an Assignment of Deed of Trust For the reasons articulated on
the record at the February 5·, 2010 hearing including the applicable law as to MERS
which Defendants' counsel was made fully aware of on that date and as set forth again
herein, Defendants' position is totally without merit and their Motion has been
interposed for no other purpose than to delay these proceedings and frustrate the
prosecution of this action. Defendants' Motion should thus be denied.
B. Applicable Law and Argument
6.

As this Court specifically found at the February 5, 2010 hearing after full

argument, Idaho courts have spoken extensively on the alleged authority of MERS to do
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anything, and have uniformly, along with other jurisdictions, rejected the authority of
MERS to undertake any action to institute or further a foreclosure including any
purported assignment of either the Note or the Deed of Trust from the original lender to
any third party, which would include Defendant BONY herein.
7. As set forth on the record at the February 5, 2010 hearing, the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Idaho, in two separate opinions, rejected the alleged
authority of MERS. The first was the matter of In Re Sheridan, Case No. 08-20381-TLM
(Opinion issued March 12, 2009). In analyzing the real party in interest requirements
and the alleged "beneficiary" status of MERS in the Deed of Trust, the Sheridan court
expressly rejected MERS' self-appointed designation as "beneficiary" in view of its
declared status of "solely as nominee", and found that the securitized mortgage loan
trust and its "trustee" had no interest in the Note or the Deed of Trust. The Court also
found that there was no language in the Note giving MERS any rights whatsoever. The
Court found that there were disputed factual issues as to who was the holder of the
Note.
8. These same disputed issues of material fact are present in this case and thus
a request for summary judgment is specious at best. The foreclosing party is a Wall
Street bank which claims to be an alleged "Trustee" of a securitized mortgage loan trust,
which is not the original lender. The Appointment of Successor Trustee and the Notice
of Trustee Sale identify different alleged "beneficiaries", none of which is the original
lender. The only purported authority of the "trustee" Wall Street Bank to do anything is
the legally voi'd and infirm MERS assignment, which is defective as a matter of law as it
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does not and cannot assign the Note or the Deed of Trust. It is without dispute that
Defendant RC has no interest in either the Note or the Deed of Trust.
9. The Idaho Bankruptcy Court went further in addressing the infirmities as to
MERS in the matter of In Re Wilhelm, Case No. 08-20577-TLM (opinion issued July 7,
2009), which was also brought to the attention of this Court and Defendants' counsel at
the February 5, 2010 hearing. In Wilhelm (as here), the Deeds of Trust named MERS
as the alleged "beneficiary", but also stated that MERS was "solely as nominee" and
that MERS held "only legal title". The Court found that the Deeds of Trust did not state
that MERS was authorized to transfer the promissory notes, but that nevertheless the
movants in four of the five cases discussed in the opinion submitted assignments in
which MERS purported to assign the Deed of Trust "together with" the note.
· 10. In again rejecting the alleged authority of MERS, the Wilhelm court noted
that the moving parties "seem to presume that the assignments, standing alone, entitle
them to enforce the underlying notes". The Court found this assumption to be
"unfounded", as the "nominal beneficiary" language in the Deeds of Trust did not, "either
expressly or by implication", authorize MERS to transfer the promissory notes.
11. The Wilhelm Court cited to the cases of Saxon Mortgage Services v. Hillery,
2008 WL 5170180 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2008) and Bellistri v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC,
2009 WL 531057 (Mo. Ct. App. March 3, 2009) in support of its position. These cases,
as well as the Wilhelm decision, are cited hereinbelow in the discussion concerning the
analysis of MERS by numerous courts throughout the United States which, like
Sheridan and Wilhelm, have uniformly and consistently rejected MERS' purported
authority to do anything.
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12. The findings by the Court in Sheridan and Wilhelm represent the current
state of the law in Idaho as to the lack of authority on the part of MERS, as recognized
by this Court in its entry of the injunction after a full hearing. Significantly, the
conclusions in Sheridan and Wilhelm are not isolated, but reflect the current state of the
law nationally as to MERS set forth below.
13. In order to understand what MERS is and what it is not, it is helpful to first
examine the structure of MERS as defined by the Supreme Courts of Kansas and
Nebraska and the Court of Appeals of New York (New York's highest court):
MERS is a private corporation that administers the MERS System, a national
electronic registry that tracks the transfer of ownership interests and servicing
rights in mortgage loans. Through the MERS system, MERS becomes the
Mortgagee of record for participating members through assignment of the
Member's interests to MERS. MERS is listed as the grantee in the otncial
records maintained at country register of deeds offices. The lenders retain
the promissory notes, as well as the se,vicing rights to the mortgages. The
lenders can then sell these interests to investors without having to record
the transaction in the public record. MERS is compensated for its services
through fees charged to participating members.
Landmark Nat. Bank v. Kessler, 216 P.3d '58, 164 (Kan. 2009)(emphasis supplied),
citing Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. v. Nebraska Dept. of Banking &
Finance, 704 N.W.2d 784, 785 (Neb. 2005)(where MERS disclaimed a position in order
to avoid registering as a business entity and thus having to pay fees).
In 1993, members of the real estate mortgage industry created MERS, an
electronic registration system for mortgages. Its purpose is to streamline the
mortgage process by eliminating the need to prepare and record paper
assignments of mortgage, as had been done for hundreds of years. To
accomplish this goal, MERS acts as nominee and as mortgagee of record
for its members nationwide and appoints itself nominee, as mortgagee,
for its members' successors and assigns, thereby remaining nominal
mortgagee of record no matter how many times loan servicing, or the
mortgage itself, may be transferred. MERS hopes to register every
residential and commercial home loan nationwide on its electronic system.
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Merscorp, inc. v. Romaine, 861 N.E.2d 81, 86 {N.Y. 2006).
14. In analyzing this defined role of MERS against the standard MERS language
in a mortgage document, the Superior Court of Rutland, Vermont in the matter of
Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. v. Johnston, Docket No. 420-6-09-Rdcv
(2009), conducted a thorough examination of the current law as to MERS, first
examining the definition of "nominee" from Black's Law Dictionary, 1076 {8th Edition!
2004) as being "a person designated to act in place of another in a very limited way"
and as "a party who holds bare legal title for the benefit of others and distributes funds
for the benefit of others". Legal title is defined as "a title that evidences apparent
ownership but does not necessarily signify full and complete title or a beneficial
interest", Black's Law Dictionary at 1523. This is in contrast to "equitable title", which is
"a title that indicates a beneficial interest in property and gives the holder the right to
acquire formal legal title".
15.

The Vermont court held that the mortgage deed consistently referred to

MERS "solely as a nominee" and that it holds "only legal title", but it then purported to
expand MERS' authority as a "nominee" to act as in essence an agent or power-ofattorney to carry out the rights of the lender, including foreclosure and sale of the
property. The court held that this purported expansion of authority was restricted to that
"necessary to comply with law or customn, and that, importantly, MERS and the lender
purposely chose to use the specific legal term "nominee" and not "agent" or "power of
attorney", and that MERS chose to define the term "nominee". The court further noted
that the mortgage deed consistently referred to the Lender's rights to the property, and
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nui i-..1C::KS', which was consistent with MERS limited authority to act "solely as
nominee".
16.

Against this backdrop of established decisional law and admissions of

MERS, the Vermont court held that MERS could not enforce the underlying obligation,
and may not enforce the mortgage deed it holds in its name with only "bare legal title".
The fact that the Defendants herein have acknowledged the presence of this same
MERS language in the Deed of Trust the subject of this action results in MERS being
subject to the same caveats as set forth in the body of decisional law set forth herein.
17.

The Vermont court examined the Nebraska decision where affirmative

representations were made by MERS that:
(a) it does not acquire mortgage loans because it only holds bare legal title in a
nominee capacity;
(b) it is contractually prohibited from exercising any rights with respect to the
mortgages, i.e. foreclosure, without the authorization of its members;
(c) it does not own the promissory notes secured by the mortgages and has no
rights to payments on the notes; and
(d) it does not take applications, underwrite loans, make decisions on whether
to extend credit, collect mortgage payments, hold escrows for taxes and insurance, or
provide any loan servicing functions whatsoever. MERS merely tracks the ownership of
the lien and is paid for its services through membership fees charged to its members,
concluding that MERS does not acquire "any loan or extension of credit secured by a
lien on real property", and that MERS "does not itself extend credit or acquire rights to
receive payments on mortgage loans; that the lenders retain the promissory notes and
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servicing rights to the mortgage, while MERS acqu;res legal tWe to the mortgage for
recordation purposes."
18. The Vermont court went on to note that counsel for MERS in the Kansas
decision "explicitly declined to demonstrate to the trial court a tangible interest in the
mortgage", citing the case at 216 P.3d at 167, and that the Kansas court found that
MERS had no stake in the outcome of an independent action for foreclosure, as it did
not lend money, nor was anyone involved in the case required to pay MERS any
money. The Kansas court concluded by holding that "If MERS is only the mortgagee,
without ownership of the mortgage instrument, it does not have an enforceable right",
adding that while the note is essential, the mortgage itself is only "an incident" to the
note.
19.

The Vermont court, expounding further on the holding of the Kansas

decision which itself noted what MERS argued to the Nebraska Supreme Court, found
that MERS was not authorized engage in practices that it would make it a party to either
the enforcement of mortgages or the transfer of mortgages. The Vermont court also
noted that MERS and the lender intentionally split the obligation and the mortgage
deed, and held that MERS lacked standing to bring a foreclosure action in its own
name, or as "nominee" on behalf of the lender.
20. The Court of Common Pleas for the State of South Carolina in the matter of
Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. v. Girdvainis, Civil Action No. 2005-CP43-0278 (Jan. 20, 2006) also held MERS to its representations previously made to the
Supreme Court of Nebraska as to its non-ownership of the promissory notes; not
extending any credit; not having any independent right to collect on any debt because
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Ml::KS d1d~ not extend any credit and that the mortgage debtor does not owe MERS any -

money; etc. and held that since MERS prevailed in the Nebraska litigation, MERS was
"judicially estopped to disavow the positions it advanced during the litigation process in
Nebraska or avoid the findings and conclusions articulated by the Nebraska court."
21. The South Carolina court, citing the caveat on MERS' authority by MERS'
own contract, held that the representation as to the assignment of the note and
mortgage to MERS "for valuable consideration" was "diametrically opposed to the
way MERS operates". The operative language in the MERS contract to which the

Girdvainis court refers is that within MERS' own contract which it has with its lenders
and servicers, which specifically limits MERS' authority as to mortgage loans and
properties the subject thereof:
MERS shall have no rights whatsoever as to any payments made on account of
such mortgage loans, to any servicing rights related to such mortgage loans, or any
mortgaged properties securing such mortgage loans. MERS agrees not to assert any
rights with respect to such mortgage loans or mortgaged properties.
22. The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Nevada in the matter
of In re Joshua and Stephanie Mitchell, Case No. BK-S-07-16226-LBR (Decision of
August 19, 2008), in analyzing what MERS stated it was according to its own website;
the testimony of the Secretary of MERS; and the definition of "beneficiary" from Black's
Law Dictionary 165 (8 th Edition 2004, the same as that used by the Vermont Court),
held that "MERS is not a beneficiary as it had no rights whatsoever to any payments,
to any servicing rights, or to any of the properties secured by the loans." (emphasis
supplied) The Court cited the same MERS "Terms and Conditions" set forth above in
the MERS v. Girdvainis decision from 2006.
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23.

Thus and

in

view of the overwhelming weight of this now established

decisional law, Defendants' assertion herein that MERS has some alleged authority to
do anything, include "assign" the Deed of Trust, is essentially specious. Defendants'
argument violates the very caveats of MERS' own contract; is vitiated by the holdings in
two separate Idaho Federal opinions; and Defendants' assertion of what MERS is
purportedly permitted to do is "diametrically opposite" of what MERS purports to be, as
affirmatively represented to and found by the Courts of Nebraska (Supreme Court},
Kansas (Supreme Court), New York (Court of Appeals), Vermont, South Carolina, and
Nevada (Federal). However, the law as to what MERS is not and cannot do does not
end there.
24. In addition to holding that MERS has no rights to the mortgage instrument,
numerous Courts of the United States have also held that MERS has no rights to the
promissory notes and no authority to transfer same. As a foreclosure requires unity of
ownership, by the same party, of both the note and the (incident) mortgage instrument,
MERS' legal inability to transfer the Note further precludes it from instituting or furthering
a foreclosure.
25. The court in the matter of Landmark National Bank v. Kessler, 216 P.3d 158,
289 Kan. 528 (Kan. 2009), held that "a nominee of the owner of a note and mortgage
may not effectively assign the note and mortgage to another for want of an ownership
interest in said note and mortgage by the nominee", and that as MERS never held the
promissory note, its assignment of the deed of trust to a third party separate from the
note had no force, citing Bellistri v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 284 S.W.3d 619, 623
(Mo.App. 2009).
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Lv~ Siyn1Lt;antly, tne Kansas Supreme L;ourt also cited In Re Wilhelm, 4u7 b.K.

392 (Bankr.D.ldaho 2009, cited hereinabove) for its holding that the "standard note
language does not expressly or implicitly authorize MERS to transfer the note", and the
decision in Saxon Mortgage Services v. Hillery, 2008 WL 5170180 (N.D.Cal. 2008) as
holding "for there to be a valid assignment, there must be more than just assignment of
the deed alone; the note must also be assigned ... MERS purportedly assigned both the
deed of trust and the promissory note ... however, there is no evidence of record that
establishes that EMRS either held the promissory note or was given the authority ... to
assign the note".
27.

The Supreme Court of Arkansas in the matter of Mortgage Electronic

Registration Systems, Inc. v. Southwest Homes of Arkansas. Inc., 2009 WL 723182
(Ark. 2009) found that the deed of trust provided that all payments were to be made to
the lender; that the lender made all decisions on late payments; no payments on the
underlying debt were made to MERS; and MERS did not service the loan in any way as
it did not oversee payments or administration of the loan in any way. MERS asserted to
be a corporation providing electronic tracking of ownership interests in residential real
property security instruments.
28. MERS argued in the Arkansas case that it held a property interest through
holding legal title with respect to the rights conveyed to the borrower by the lender. The
Court's response: "We disagree". The Court found that title was conveyed to the trustee;
that the deed of trust did not convey title to MERS; and that as such, MERS was not the
"beneficiary" even though it is so designated in the deed of trust. The Court held
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that the iender on the deed of rrust was th·e bGnefic,ary~ as

1( 1

et;eiveu payments on the

debt secured by the property.
29.

Similarly here, MERS is not the trustee; MERS did not receive any

payments; and thus MERS is not the "beneficiary" despite what Defendants claim. The
law cited above is clear and consistent that the "person for whose benefit a trust deed is
given" is the lender, not MERS.
30.

As set forth above, the Kansas decision in Landmark cited (as did the

Wilhelm decision from Idaho) the case of Bellistri v. Ocwen, 284 S.W. 3d 619
(Mo.App.E.D. 2009). That case held that the record reflected no evidence "that MERS
held the promissory note or that the original lender gave MERS the authority to transfer
the promissory note. MERS could not transfer the promissory note; therefore the
language in the assignment of the deed of trust purporting to transfer the promissory
note

was

ineffective",

citing

Black

v.

Adrian,

80

S.W.3d

909,

914-915

(Mo.App.S. D.2002).
31.

As set forth hereinabove, the Idaho Federal Bankruptcy Court in In Re

Wilhelm (cited above) similarly held, finding that although the deeds of trust named
MERS as the "nominal beneficiary", this language did not, either expressly or by
implication, authorize MERS to transfer the promissory notes. Without any transfer of
the Notes, there was no interest in the Note by the party seeking to pursue a foreclosure
through a MERS assignment.
32. Defendants completely ignore this wealth of recent decisional law, including
that from the state of Idaho, with its consistent findings and holdings nullifying any
alleged authority of MERS to do anything other than electronically track mortgage loans,
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which

law

c"6mplete1y' vfffales ·the entirety of Defendants' positions as to !VIERS and

completely destroys the very foundation of Defendants' assertions. In view of this wealth
of authority, Defendants' arguments should be rejected and its Motion denied in its
entirety, whether couched as a Motion to Dismiss or as a request for summary
judgment.
33.

Defendants' entire premise rests on the unfounded (and legally incorrect)

assumption that MERS assigned the Deed of Trust and that simply because "MERS
role was fully disclosed" that the alleged Assignment was legally proper. As this Court
recognized at the prior hearing and has been established by the consistent case law
nationally including the law from Idaho, Defendants' assertions are not only unfounded,
but have been expressly rejected on the law not only in Idaho but by a multitude of
jurisdictions, both state and Federal, across the United States, with several of these
jurisdictions relying in part for their decisions on the findings of the Idaho Federal
Bankruptcy Court in the Wilhelm.
34. As such, whether Defendants allegedly "complied with" the Idaho foreclosure
procedure is irrelevant to the inquiry and issues raised by the Complaint. The real issue,
which Defendants ignored at the last hearing and continue to ignore, is whether they
had any alleged authority to even undertake actions toward foreclosure, which the
decisional law of Idaho and numerous jurisdictions throughout the United States have
uniformly held that they cannot as a matter of law.
C. Plaintiff Has the Right to Seek a Declaration as to the Foreclosure Controversy
35. As set forth in the Complaint and Affidavit, Plaintiff has no idea of how any of
the Defendants came into any ownership interest of his mortgage loan. Although MERS
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is mentioned In the Deed of Trust,

rt

is not the beneficiary and 1s"n6t mentioned in the

Note, and there is no evidence that the original lender ever gave MERS either rights to
the Note or rights to transfer the note to MERS. As such, Plaintiff is entitled to seek a
declaration as to his rights under the Note and Deed of Trust.
36. Significantly, Defendants have made no complaint that Plaintiff did not plead
all of the elements to state a cause of action for either Declaratory or Injunctive Relief,
which Plaintiff has in fact done in requesting Injunctive Relief pursuant to Idaho Rules of
Civil Procedure 65, and in requesting Declaratory Relief pursuant to Idaho Statutes
Tiele 10, Chapter 12, sections 10-1202 et seq.
37.

Defendants have raised nothing more than disagreement with the facts

plead while ignoring the real significant disputed issues of material facts raised by the
Complaint and Exhibits thereto. What Defendants' Motion does is simply reaffirm that
there are disputed issues of material fact which require that this matter advance to full
jury trial as demanded in the Complaint.
38.

Further, and perhaps even more significantly, Defendants have failed to

even address the matters of credit enhancements, insurances, and applicable setoffs to
the claimed amount due as set forth in paragraphs 15 and 16 of the Complaint. Plaintiff
thus asserts that the Defendants have thus admitted the truth of these matters, leaving
only, for discovery, the issues of whether Defendant BONY was paid 100, 200, or more
percent on the loan and is thus attempting to be paid a third time by foreclosing.
Alternatively, should this Court determine that the Defendants have disputed these
material facts, same remain as issues to be litigated at the trial of this cause.
D. Conclusion
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30.

B:_~er~dai .~;;' i:..,:c;t;. ~ prer.-1is~ rests on a legally flawed and void pur._:,.:>rted

grant of authority from Defendant MERS. Defendants' entire position has been rejected
by Idaho law and the law of numerous other jurisdictions.
40.

Defendants have done nothing more than to raise disputed issues of

material fact which must be resolved at trial.
41.

Defendants' Motion provides no grounds for dismissal or any other

dispositive relief, and should be denied in its entirety.
42. Plaintiff requests that he be awarded his attorneys' fees in connection with
defending the Defendants' Motion should this Court deem same appropriate.
WHEREFORE,

Plaintiff

respectfully

requests

that

this

Court

deny

the

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for the reasons set forth herein, and for any other and
further relief which is just and proper.
Dated this 12th day of May, 2010.

Jeff Barnes, Esq.
Admitted pro hac vice
101
W. J. Barnes, P.A.
Nevada office, c/o lnt'I Mediation Assoc., Inc.
6655 West Sahara Avenue, Suite 8200
Las Vegas, Nevada 89146

MONICA FLOOD BRENNAN, ESQ.
608 Northwest Boulevard, Suite
Coeur D'Alene, Idaho 83814
Tel: (208) 665-0088
Attorneys for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing on opposing
counsel at the following:
Lance Olsen
Routh, Crabtee Olsen, P.S.
Fax: 425-283-5905
STATE OF IDAHO
COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
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